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I. HYPOTHETICAL: A SLOw DEATH FOR THE CITY PERFECT
The City Perfect is a thriving metropolitan area in the south-
eastern region of the United States. Weather conditions are ideal for
families, corporations and small businesses. Summers are nice and
warm; winters are cool and tolerable with less icy weather than one
would experience in the northern regions. The City Perfect is less than
two hours away from the great Appalachian Mountains and less than
three hours away from the beautiful waters of the Atlantic Ocean. The
City Perfect is dissected by three interstate highways and an aerial
interstate system that is conducive to commerce.
The City Perfect is home to the busiest and largest interna-
tional airport in the world, which millions of travelers pass through
each year. The City Perfect is no stranger to the international commu-
nity, for she hosted the Summer Olympics a few years ago. The City
Perfect is arguably an epicenter of academic retreat for African-Ameri-
cans and home to many major institutions that affect the world. The
City Perfect is proud to hold the seat of her state government and is
home to crucial federal government entities, including the Centers for
Disease Control, the Federal Reserve and a regional Environmental
Protection Agency office. The City Perfect has attracted individuals
from all across the world who now call her home. In fact, the City Per-
fect contributes to her state's increase in population growth.
However, this growth in business, population and significance
is placing a huge toll on the City Perfect. The infrastructure has taken
a beating. The highways are overcrowded. Though designed for conve-
nience, they become inconveniently congested during certain times of
the day. As with any large metropolitan area, the concentration of peo-
ple has attracted individuals who lack a desire to comply with policy,
rules and laws. Most importantly, the vital resources that humans re-
quire to survive are stretching thin. The air is tainted by emissions
from vehicles, factories and other sources. The level of sewage being
produced each day is almost defeating the system designed for dispos-
ing of it. The water supply, critical to any development, has been
challenged by recent droughts and demand for adequate supply
downstream.
City officials of the City Perfect never imagined that the de-
mand for water would be an issue for her constituents. They were
more focused on ensuring the infrastructure that provides the drinking
water was intact. City officials for the City Perfect were under great
pressure from constituents because of television images of big trucks
falling in sinkholes in downtown city streets due to failures in the pip-
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ing system. Images of water percolating from the ground and running
down busy highways had become a weekly occurrence.
However, it was never a secret that the city could not operate
without water. One city official had a vision and painted a very dim
picture. He explained that a loss of water for one day would cause a
major hiccup in the business world. Government entities would be
forced to cease business operations for that day. The grocery markets
would be inundated with individuals purchasing water for drinking,
cooking and cleaning. Bottled sources would be depleted within hours.
The medical arena would experience minor setbacks, as backup water
supplies would have to be ushered to the hospitals. He further ex-
plained that the loss of water for a week would be devastating. The
business world would take a great hit. Many small businesses would
not survive losing income for an entire week. The local government,
state government and federal entities would experience a major set-
back of losing an unexpected week of work. The international airport
would be greatly affected and would experience cancelled flights. This
block of cancellations would send ripples throughout the entire avia-
tion industry. The restaurant business would come to a screeching
halt. Sanitation issues would cause great alarm from all corners of the
metropolitan region. All medical facilities would be forced to alterna-
tive methods for sterilization, cooking, cleaning and other functions.
As the city official continued to proceed, he dropped his head.
He knew he was about to voice Armageddon for the City Perfect. For
the first time, the City Perfect and its officials were faced with a mate-
rializing scenario that could equate to the slow death of this great
metropolis. They were words that few dared to think and fewer still
dared to speak. How was it possible that a resource as simple as water
could be the downfall of a city so powerful? If the City Perfect lost
water for a month, the results would be catastrophic. No small busi-
ness could withstand the loss of water for such a length of time.
Federal efforts to mobilize water to the area would have the impact of
pouring a bottle of water onto a forest fire 10 miles long. Large corpo-
rations would be forced to transfer their operations to other areas so
that business could continue. The loss of revenue to the local govern-
ment and businesses would result in irreversible damage to the
financial structure and the economy.
The City Perfect would experience extreme job loss and unem-
ployment. The intense migration to the City Perfect would reverse and
its citizens would move away in masses. All medical facilities would
cease to operate and surrounding medical facilities would be flooded
with individuals needing medical attention. The federal government
2012 347
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would have to assist with mass evacuations that would dwarf those
witnessed in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The region would
experience a population shift unseen in the history of this great nation.
Infrastructures, schools, highways, medical facilities and government
resources in other areas would be stretched to their limits from the
sharp increase in population. The City Perfect would cease to exist and
the implications would be widespread.
II. ACTUAL
The hypothetical city is not far from reality and closely resem-
bles the water situation that currently exists in Atlanta, Georgia. The
deteriorating infrastructure', population explosion 2 , drought condi-
tions3 and downriver demand for water on the Chattahoochee 4 has
shaped up to be the perfect storm for Atlanta's water woes. The crisis
in Atlanta is a sign of problems to come for cities east of the Mississippi
River that have traditionally enjoyed an abundance of water. Unlike
the western states, which have experienced mounds of disputes and
litigation about water, the eastern United States is littered with lakes,
rivers, streams and springs which prevented significant disputes in re-
lations to accessible and abundant water supplies.
Historically this plentiful supply of water has satisfied all water
needs and led the eastern states to adopt a modified version of English
water law called riparianism.5 Under the riparian system, eastern
states assign rights for water use to land owners and require sharing
1. Geoffrey Segal, What Can We Learn from Atlanta's Water Privatization, GEORGIA
PUBLIC POLICY FOUNDATION, Jan. 31, 2003, available at http://reason.org/news/show/
122661.html ("Using EPA estimates, communities will need an estimated $300 billion to $1
trillion over the next 20 years to repair, replace, or upgrade aging drinking water and
wastewater facilities; accommodate a growing population; and meet new water quality
standards. EPA projects a $650 billion shortfall between current spending levels and money
that will be needed over the next 15 years.")
2. Id. ("Over the last 40 years the Atlanta metropolitan area experienced rapid
growth.")
3. Stacey Shelton, Lake Lanier Remains Perilously Low, Recovery to Last Long,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Dec. '21, 2008, available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/
content/metro/stories/2008/12/21/lake lanier level.html ("Earlier this month, Lanier came
within 2 inches of breaking last year's record low before several inches of rain pumped in
billions of gallons of water. Today the lake is more than a foot above the record low elevation
set Dec. 26, 2007, and still more than 17 feet below full.")
4. Judge Rules Against Florida in Tri-state Water Dispute, U.S. WATER NEWS ONLINE,
Aug. 2006, httpJ/www.uswaternews.com/archives/arpolicy/6judgrule8.html ("Ultimately,
Florida's demand for more water than is naturally occurring was unrealistic, especially in
light of Georgia's current severe drought conditions.")
5. JOSEPH L. SAx, BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS,
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 27 (4th ed. 2006).
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among users in times of shortages.6 Due to the demand for water in
the Atlanta area, the demand for water by farmers in South Georgia
and Alabama, and the demand for water in the mid-panhandle of Flor-
ida for environmental reasons, the area has witnessed a water war
emerge with western characteristics. Despite conservation efforts, the
water demand is sharply increasing7 and will require a unique
solution.
This note takes a comprehensive look at the Apalachicola, Chat-
tahoochee, Flint (ACF) region, past litigation, and failed attempts to
negotiate. This note also strongly recommends a solution that is viable
in Florida, Georgia and Alabama with additional economic benefits to
Tennessee. Part I dives into the ACF river region with a detailed look
at each river. Next, Part II examines the root behind the demand for
water and inclinations for future use. Part III evaluates and details
negotiations to resolve the problem and litigation that has transpired.
Part IV takes us back historically to areas with similar disputes, their
solutions and how application of those solutions to the ACF would fare.
Finally, Part V offers a solution to the ACF water demand that in-
volves economic gains for the state of Tennessee. As this note will
illustrate, conventional attempts of water conservation and allocation
will not suffice with this water problem. Though unique in nature, the
solution this note proposes is the most beneficial way to resolve the
ACF region water problem. Without a unique solution like this note
offers, the City of Atlanta will become the City Un-perfect.
A. Rivers of the ACF Region
The rivers of the ACF region include the Apalachicola, Chatta-
hoochee and Flint rivers. Headwaters of the Chattahoochee and Flint
rivers begin in north Georgia.8 The Chattahoochee and the Flint com-
bine in south Georgia to form the Apalachicola River.9 The
Apalachicola River flows through the Florida panhandle and into the
Apalachicola Bay.10 Combined, the ACF region covers roughly 19,600
6. Id. at 33.
7. METROPOLITAN NORTH GEORGIA WATER PLANNING DISTRICT, WATER SUPPLY AND
WATER CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT PLAN 2 (2003), available at http://www.northgeorgia
water.com/files/WSWCExecSum.pdf.
8. Brian D. Richter et al., Ecologically Sustainable Water Management: Managing
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square miles throughout Georgia, Florida and Alabama." The basin is
roughly 385 miles top to bottom. 12 This area equates to 12.3 million
acres of regional drainage into the rivers.' 3 Even though the majority
of the area is forested, the land is 6 percent residential, 2 percent com-
mercial, and 25 percent agricultural.' 4 There are 16 reservoirs on the
main stems of the river.' 5
B. The Area
Most of the region's coverage is based in Georgia, which com-
prises 90 percent of its population, holds 75 percent of the basin's land
area and accounts for slightly more than 80 percent of the water with-
drawals.16 7 percent of the population in the ACF river region lives in
Alabama.' 7 Roughly 15 percent of the basin is within the state of Ala-
bama and the state accounts for 11 percent of the withdrawal.' 8 The
remaining 3 percent of the population, 11 percent of the land area and
7 percent of withdrawals come from the state of Florida.' 9 The upper
Chattahoochee is home to Lake Lanier, which provides drinking water
for most of the Metropolitan Atlanta area. 20 Farmers in west Georgia
and east Alabama account for most of the consumption of water in the
middle. 21 The lower end of the river region is predominately the Apa-
lachicola River corridor and estuary that houses an environmentally
sensitive wildlife system with endangered species. 22
11. Stephen E. O'Day et al., Wars Between The States in the 21st Century: Water Law
in an Era of Scarcity, 10 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 229, 231 (2009).
12. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT RIVER





16. O'Day et al., supra note 11, at 232.
17. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 12.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. ATLANTA REGIONAL COMMISSION, TRI-STATE WATER WARS, http://www.atlanta
regional.com/environment/tri-state-water-wars.
21. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 12.
22. Id. (Some endangered species include Gulf sturgeon, shoal bass, mussels [fat
threeridge, chipola slabshell, purple bankclimber].)
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C. Problematic Water Availability
"In Georgia's sixteen-county Metropolitan North Georgia Water
Planning District alone, approximately 652 million gallons of water are
used every day; the District predicts that population within the Dis-
trict will increase from four million in 2000, to nearly eight million by
2030."23 The projected increases in population will almost double the
approximate million gallons of water per day demand.24 Currently, the
Metro Water District receives 99 percent of its water supply from six
rivers' basins, 25 whose headwaters begin in the Metro Atlanta area.26
Since most of these basins have very small headwater areas, Lake
Lanier and the Chattahoochee River account for approximately 73per-
cent of the metro water supply.2 7 Metro Atlanta is currently permitted
to use 767.85 million gallons per day-from the Chattahoochee River
Basin.28 Thus, a problem emerges because the permitted amount is
strategically calculated to provide water for Metro Atlanta while at the
same time assuring the water demands for parties downstream of
Metro Atlanta are reasonably met. There are plans to build two addi-
tional reservoirs on the Chattahoochee River; however, they are
estimated to yield only an additional 21.4 million gallons per day.2 9
How did we get to this problem? What happened to increase the de-
mand and to strain the supply?
In the early 1900's water in the north Georgia area, particularly
the Chattahoochee River, was more than sufficient to supply the small
demand created by a very modest population base.30 The Chattahoo-
chee finds its origins in the north Georgia Mountains, 3,200 above sea
level, with its first headwaters percolating from a patch of sand and
gravel in the mountains near the Chattahoochee Gap on the Appalach-
ian Trail. 31 As the river flows, it quickly joins with many other springs
23. O'Day et al., supra note 11, at 230 (discussing the implication of population growth
in the Atlanta Metro region).
24. METROPOLITAN NORTH GEORGIA WATER PLANNING DISTRICT, WATER SUPPLY AND
WATER CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT PLAN § 3, at 14, (2009), available at http://www.north
georgiawater.org/files/Sec3_WaterDemandForecastsWSWCMay2009.pdf.
25. METROPOLITAN NORTH GEORGIA WATER PLANNING DISTRICT, WATER SUPPLY AND
WATER CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT PLAN § 2, at 1, (2009), available at http://www.north
georgiawater.org/files/Sec2_ExistingFacilities WSWC May2009.pdf.
26. Id. (Chattahoochee, Coosa, Flint, Ocmulgee, Oconee and Tallapoosa river basins).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
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and tributaries flowing down the mountainside. 32 The Chattahoochee
River is a source of fresh water and an expression of Mother Nature. 33
As the river flows through the mountains, it creates breathtaking wa-
terfalls before peacefully entering the Atlanta area in the northern
suburbs.34 After gracing Atlanta, the river flows southwest creating
the border between Georgia and Alabama where it is joined with the
Flint River, ultimately creating the Florida panhandle's Apalachicola
River.35
The untamed river often flooded areas in north Georgia during
the early 1900's.36 Because of the frequent flooding, residents of West
Point raised their wooden sidewalks five feet above the ground.37 To
help control the flooding, masterminds of that time turned to dam-
ming. The federal government stepped in and the Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) received congressional approval to build the Buford
Dam on the Chattahoochee River, thereby creating Lake Lanier.38 The
Buford dam was completed in 1956.39 The damming created a 38,000-
acre lake with 692 miles of shoreline.40 Today, Lake Lanier is a popu-
lar vacationing spot for camping, fishing, boating, swimming,
picnicking and sightseeing and accommodates 7.5 million visitors an-
nually. 41 It was in the 1970s that the Corps first agreed to use water
from Lake Lanier as drinking water 42 and thus Lake Lanier began to
quench the thirst of the Metro Atlanta area. Before the decision, a vast
majority (99percent) of the water supply was extracted directly from
the river.43 The thirst of Metro Atlanta was easily quenchable until the
population grew.
32. Id.
33. ABOUT NORTH GEORGIA, WATERFALLS OF NORTH GEORGIA, http://ngeorgia.com/ang/
Waterfalls-of NorthGeorgia (last visited May 27, 2012).
34. Id.
35. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 12.
36. Chattahoochee River, supra note 30 (illustrating the flow of the Chattahoochee
before damming and drought conditions).
37. GEORGIA GENEALOGY, WEST PoINT, TRouP CouNTY, GEORGIA HISTORY (2004), http:l
www.georgiagenealogy.org/troup/west point history.htm.
38. O'Day et al., supra note 11, at 234.
39. Id.
40. Chattahoochee River, supra note 30.
41. Id.
42. O'Day et al., supra note 11, at 234.
43. METROPOLITAN NORTH GEORGIA WATER PLANNING DISTRICT, supra note 25.
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III. THE GREAT MIGRATION TO ATLANTA
In 1900, the city of Atlanta had a population of almost 90,000.44
By 1950, the Metro Atlanta population increased to 998,000 re-
sidents. 45 According to the 2010 census, the same area now has a
population of 5,730,000.46 With desirable weather conditions, growing
entertainment and a great living atmosphere, the population growth of
Metro Atlanta is showing no sign of slowing. To demonstrate the
growth of Metro Atlanta, one author stated, "[t]o put such dramatic
population growth in perspective, consider that metropolitan Atlanta
grows by the total population of the town of Apalachicola every
month."47 In 1989, the population increase directly led the Corps to
reallocate water in Lake Lanier that was designated for hydropower
usage to water supply instead.48
When considering the great migration to Atlanta, many tend to
focus more on people; however, there was also a migration of compa-
nies and federal government activity that resulted in a huge economic
boom.49 After the Civil War, the redevelopment of the railroad system
spurred growth and economic development.50 City leaders within At-
lanta shared a new vision for growth in the early twentieth century.51
Regional initiatives shifted from focusing on the railroad to developing
a regional business center with aims of supporting commerce and eco-
nomic growth.52 Visionaries Ivan Allen Sr. and W.R.C. Smith of the
Atlanta Chamber of Commerce launched a national advertising cam-
paign in 1925 entitled "Forward Atlanta."53 This plan sold Atlanta as a
gold mine for new businesses and a great place for large national cor-




47. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICAN'S FRESH WATERS 188 (2002).
48. Andrew Thornley, A Tale of Two River Basins: The Southeast Finds Itself In A Rare
Interstate Water Struggle, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 97, 100 (2005); see also William L.
Andreen, State Surveys: Alabama, in 6 WATER WARS AND WATER RIGHTS 20, 28 (Robert E.
Beck ed., Supp. 2004).





53. GEORGIAINFO, THIs DAY IN GEORGIA HISTORY OCTOBER 16, http://georgiainfo.
galileo.usg.edultdgh-oct/octl6.htm.
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porations to locate regional offices. 5 4 The plan of Allen and Smith was
highly successful, bringing thousands of jobs and adding an estimated
$34 million55 in annual payrolls to the city's economy.56
The arrival of automobiles also affected population growth. The
automobile allowed residents to easily move around the region and re-
sulted in a housing boom with further development away from the
city's center.57 It was not long before air travel graced the region in the
1920's and Atlanta developed a passenger terminal, airmail and pas-
senger routes that elevated its reputation as a regional business
center.58
World War II (1941-45) brought many opportunities to Atlanta
and the south in general.59 As a response to the war, the federal gov-
ernment invested more than $10 billion in war industries and military
bases located in the South.60 As a boost to the local government struc-
ture, the federal government financially supported housing projects,
health-care facilities and built schools to support the families relocated
to military installations.6 1 This activity by the federal government was
beneficial to Atlanta because it helped end the depression; swelled the
city's population; spread a broad net of federal installations throughout
the metropolitan area; and enlisted blacks, whites, men and women, in
the armed forces and in war-related industries.62
Many soldiers were brought to Atlanta and did not leave.63 As
a result, the Metro Atlanta area experienced a spurt in population
growth, prompting the city to annex more residents.64 It was during
this period that Atlanta annexed an additional 82 square miles, adding
100,000 new residents.65 To meet the city's growing needs, more high-
54. Id.
55. See generally THE NEw GEORGIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 48 (circa 1935).




60. Id. (War allowed the government to spark the economy by strategically locating
jobs during a economic difficult time.)
61. Christopher Tassava, The American Economy During World War II, ECONOMIC
HISTORY SERVICES ENCYCLOPEDIA (2010), available at http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/
tassava.WWII.
62. THE NEw GEORGIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 48.
63. Id.
64. Id. (Annexation was met with resistance.)
65. Id.
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ways were expanded or built.66 The proactive approach to highway
building allowed the Metro Atlanta area to take full advantage of
funds from the interstate highway program, an approach that allowed
the city to later connect with three major interstate highways connect-
ing Atlanta to the region and fed suburban metropolitan growth
(Interstates 75, 85 & 20).67 By 2009, Atlanta was ranked number 4 in
cities with the most Fortune 500 company headquarters.6 8 The combi-
nation of population growth and economic growth has equated to a
rapidly growing demand for water in the Metro Atlanta area. The
north Georgia Water Planning District has proclaimed "without ade-
quate planning and conservation measures, the demands of population
growth will lead to exhaustion of available water supplies as soon as
2017."69
IV. FARMERS NEED WATER, Too...
It is reasonable to conclude that while Metro Atlanta was exper-
iencing a huge growth spurt, agriculture would also experience a peak
in activity. Right before the Great Depression, so many farmers were
producing crops that the overabundance in supply created extremely
low prices, placing many farmers in difficult financial positions.70 In
an attempt to fix the problem, Congress passed the Agriculture Adjust-
ment Act which paid farmers to not plant certain crops so the
decreased supply would yield higher dividends for those that continued
to plant.7 1 However, the administration of this Act favored larger
farmers and most subsidies were paid in the Midwest. 72 Recently in
2006, the top three states receiving subsidies were Texas, Iowa and
Illinois respectively, with Georgia ranking number 16 with almost 6




68. Annual Ranking of America's Largest Corporations, FORTUNE, (May 4, 2009),
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2009/cities/.
69. METROPOLITAN NORTH GEORGIA WATER PIANNING DISTRICT, supra note 7.
70. Cary Nelson, The Depression in the United States - An Overview, MODERN
AMERICAN POETRY, available at http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/overview.
htm.
71. See generally Agriculture Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1938).
72. ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, FARM SUBSIDY DATABASE, available at http://
farm.ewg.org/ (Texas - over $23 billion, Iowa - almost $21 billion, Illinois - over $17 billion).
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billion dollars in subsidies.73 In 1997, Georgia's 43,000 farmers gener-
ated approximately $7.4 billion in annual farm gate sales.74
Irrigation, which assisted Georgia farmers during the drought,
was developed over the years to sustain crop growth in areas and in
conditions that were once impossible.75 In Georgia and Alabama, how-
ever, where dry land farming is possible almost every year, irrigation
can boost yields significantly. Thus, the principal irrigation benefit to
farmers in Georgia and Alabama is providing water to crops that are
experiencing a lesser amount of rain than historically experienced. Ir-
rigation may become even more critical to farmers in the future if
weather conditions continue to become less favorable for plants that
need steady water. According to a study by the University of Mary-
land, the agricultural sector is likely to experience uneven impacts
throughout the country as weather patterns shift from the norm and
become more unpredictable in the Georgia region. 76 The study predicts
regional droughts and water shortages.77 In addition, the spread of
pests and diseases will negatively affect agriculture in the region.78
As more farmers in the ACF Region resort to irrigating, the de-
mand for water from farmers in the area will increase. Many farmers
in the ACF region have resorted to ground water extraction. Often, this
is done with high capacity wells capable of producing high volumes of
water. For instance, a 6" well can produce 125 gallons per minute.79
This depth well could fill an Olympic size swimming pool in roughly 3.5
days.80 In 2000, for irrigation purposes, Georgia used 732 million gal-
lons per day8' and Alabama used 73 million gallons per day.82 Well
water is not a relief to rivers that depend upon ground water infusion
73. Id.
74. UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES,
IMPACT OF AGRICULTURE ON GEORGIA'S ECONOMY, available at http://www.ces.uga.edul
Agriculture/agecon/pubs/paper/impact.htm ("Farm gate sales" refers to the sale of products
directly from the producer.).
75. Robert Davids, Farm Irrigation - A Primer (2010).
76. MATTHIAS RUTH ET AL., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON GEORGIA 4




79. Industry and government standard identifies a large capacity well as one with the
capability of producing more than 70 gallons per minute or 100,000 gallons per day.
80. Olympic Size Swimming Pool - 164' long, 82' wide, 6' 7" deep.
81. GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, GEORGIA GROUND WATER CONDITIONS,
available at http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/state fact-sheets/georgia.pdf.
82. GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, ALABAMA GROUND WATER CONDITIONS,
available at http://www.gwpc.orgle-library/documents/state fact-sheets/alabama.pdf.
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to maintain flow and recharge the river. An infusion problem occurs
when the natural ground water level is above the river.83 Under nor-
mal hydrogeological conditions, the ground water would infuse into the
river.84 Over-extraction from wells lowers this level, thus resulting in
little to no ground water infusion into the river directly affecting river
flow and available water.85 The New Jersey Geological Survey Report
states:
The potential for natural groundwater recharge begins with precip-
itation (rain, snow, hail, sleet). Some of the precipitation never
seeps into the soil, but instead leaves the system as surface runoff.
The water that seeps into the soil is infiltration. Part of the water
that does infiltrate is returned to the atmosphere through Evapo-
transpiration. Evapotranspiration refers to water that is returned
to the atmosphere from vegetated areas by evaporation from the
soil and plant surfaces and soil water that is taken up by plant
roots and transpired through plant leaves or needles. Infiltrated
water that is not returned to the atmosphere by Evapotranspiration
moves vertically downward and, upon reaching the saturated zone,
becomes ground water. This ground water could be in a geologic
material that is either an aquifer or non-aquifer, depending on
whether it can yield satisfactory quantities to wells.86
In essence, pumping ground water at a rate faster than it recharges
will have detrimental effects on the underground water table and the
rivers in the area.87
V. ALONG CAME A DROUGHT
Historical data shows that droughts are a standard part of the
climate system in the Southeast.88 The natural ecosystem in Georgia
requires drought conditions to thrive.8 9 This ecosystem consists of the
plants and animals that have learned to survive without intervention
from humans.9 0 Animals and plants that do not require much water
and plants that utilize dry, windy conditions to help with pollination
83. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 478.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. New Jersey Geological Survey Report GSR-32, Chapter 6-2 (2004) available at
http://www.state.nj.us/dep/stormwater/bmpmanual/NJ_SWBMP 6percent20print.pdf.
87. METROPOLITAN NORTH GEORGIA WATER PLANNING DISTRICT, supra note 7.
88. David Stooksbury, Historical Droughts in Georgia and Drought Assessment and
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(like the Needle Pine Tree) occupy this area.9 1 Periodic drought condi-
tions, even severe, help sustain the natural ecosystem even though
drought conditions are not productive for humans and have negative
impacts on economic and social systems. 92 As witnessed in the 1920s,
drought conditions have historically had a great negative impact on
industry and farming.93 As a result, rural Georgia counties have failed
to rebound to the population peak experienced right before drought in
1920.94
The U.S. Geological Survey confirmed that during the year
2000, Alabama, Florida and Georgia suffered the driest May-October
months on record.95 Despite the lack of precipitation, Georgia exper-
ienced a 30 percent increase in water usage compared to usage before
the declaration of drought in the later 1990s. 9 6 The drought of 2007,
with lower than normal rainfall, began in 2006.97 The October 3, 2007
issue of Southeast Farm Press reported John Beasley, University of
Georgia Extension peanut specialist, saying residents deemed the 2007
drought worse than an infamously bad drought experienced in 1954.98
As the lack of rain persisted from spring into the summer of
2007, it was quickly becoming clear that the 2007 drought threatened
to become a huge problem for the ACF river region and north Georgia.
Governor Sonny Perdue (2003-2011) placed the northern third of the
state under a state of emergency, implemented water restrictions
throughout the state, and asked President Bush to declare the area a
"major disaster."99 The situation was so calamitous officials declared
that water in Lake Lanier would be depleted in three months.100 In an
attempt to protect the citizens of north Georgia, Perdue asked Presi-
dent Bush to exempt the Corps from complying with federal water
release regulations designed to protect mussels downstream.101
91. Id.
92. Larry West, What are the Effects of Drought?, ABOuT.cOM, available at http://
environment.about.com/od/environmentalevents/a/droughteffects.htm.
93. Historical Droughts in Georgia, supra note 86.
94. Id.
95. Maria Dolan, A Brief History of Drought in Georgia 2 (2007), available at http://
www.walterreeves.com/uploads/pdf/droughtinhistory.pdf.
96. Julia L. Fanning, Water Use In Georgia, 2000; And Trends, 1950-2000, available at
http://www.gwri.gatech.eduluploads/proceedings/2003/Fanning.pdf.
97. Dolan, supra note 85.
98. Id.
99. Georgia's Governor Declares Drought Emergency, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 20,
2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21393296/ns/weather/.
100. Id.
101. Congressional delegation writes Bush about Georgia drought request, NORTH
GEORGIA NEWS, Oct. 25, 2007, http://new.accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n=84693&c=10.
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As water resources became dire for north Georgia, the true
politics of the situation became more evident. "We've learned from this
what a blunt weapon the Endangered Species Act has become," said
state Rep. John Linder. 102 "We need to understand this lake was cre-
ated not for mussels but for people."103 The drought was so severe that
watering in the northern half of the state was partially, then totally,
banned by environmental officials. 104 Drought conditions thus added a
new dimension to the challenge of providing adequate water to meet
expectations of the water recipients in the ACF region. Drought condi-
tions stressed the water supply that was available and made water
resources in the ACF region more valuable. The demand for more
water and disputes in usage ultimately led to litigation and
compromises.
V. A TWISTED TIMELINE OF REQUESTS, LITIGATION AND COMPROMISES
A. Georgia Makes the First Move
In the late 1980s, prior to the droughts of 2000 and 2007, the
leaders of the state of Georgia, specifically Metro Atlanta, were devis-
ing plans to secure water for the needs of the metropolitan area in the
event that water resources once again became scarce.105 Considering
the dangers and attempting to avoid a disaster of great proportions,
Georgia sought to increase its water supply by pursuing a deal with the
Corps to increase water release to Metro Atlanta.106 Convinced by the
present danger and to prepare for the new residents expected to move
to Atlanta in the next twenty years, the Corps agreed to release more
water to Metro Atlanta.107
The plans to supply north Georgia with water did not stop
there. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers also planned to store water
on the Coosa River, which ultimately flows into the state of Ala-
102. Georgia's Governor Declares Drought Emergency, supra note 89.
103. Id.
104. Lawrenceville Weather Blog, Georgia Watering Ban Declared as Drought Worsens
(2007), http://www.lawrencevilleweather.com/blog/2007/09/georgia-watering-ban-declared-
as-drought-worsens.html.
105. Benjamin Snowden, Bargaining In The Shadow Of Uncertainty: Understanding
The Failure Of The ACF And ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134, 139 (2005).
106. Id.
107. Mark Hawk, Conservation and Natural Resources: Interstate Compacts, 14 GA. ST.
U.L. REV. 47, 48 (1997).
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bama.108 Additionally, a plan was revised to withdraw more water
from the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers.109 As one would imagine this
plan did not sit too well with the state of Alabama.110 The plan
amounted to less water for the entire state of Alabama. 1 1 It would
also deprive the Coosa River of water, which crosses the center of the
state, and reduce the Chattahoochee, which serves the southeastern
part of the state of Alabama. 1 1 2 Large municipalities in Alabama, such
as Birmingham and Montgomery, are in the affected area. 13
B. Alabama Calls on Lady Justice
Alabama responded as many projected they would, and in June
of 1990 they brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.11 4
The state of Alabama sought relief requesting that the court declare
that the Corps violated provisions of the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA) before entering contractual agreements with Georgia to
release more water from Lake Lanier.115 Alabama urged the court to
issue a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the Corps to
comply with the provisions and regulations of NEPA and to recall and
to refrain from executing proposed contracts for withdrawals of water
from Lake Lanier and prohibiting any increase in withdrawals of water
until a requested Comprehensive Studies Plan was completed.1 16 Spe-
cifically, Alabama argued that by entering into contracts with Georgia,
the Corps violated NEPA by not preparing an environmental impact
study.117 Alabama further argued that NEPA required the Corps
when allocating water to follow a "systematic, interdisciplinary ap-
proach."s18 Alabama also argued "by preparing only an Environmental
Assessment (EA) regarding the Post Authorization Change Notifica-
108. Id. See also Charles Seabrook, Water Wars Take Shape Between Ga., Neighbors,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Nov. 27, 1989 (The Coosa River is a tributary of the






114. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Alabama "sued the Army Corps of Engineers in the Northern District of Alabama for
declaratory and injunctive relief.")
115. Id. at 1123.
116. Id. (This particular relief was contingent upon the court ruling in Alabama's favor
on the declaratory judgment.)
117. Id. at 1124.
118. Id. at 1134.
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tion report for Lake Lanier, rather than a full Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS") as required by NEPA, and by failing to assess the
cumulative impacts of the proposed increased withdrawals of water
from ACF Basin," a very critical aspect of NEPA was violated.119 Fi-
nally, Alabama argued Corps violated NEPA "by failing to develop
methods and procedures to ensure that 'presently unquantifiable envi-
ronmental amenities and values' are considered in assessing the
environmental impacts of withdrawing water from Lake Lanier."120
After conversations between Alabama and the Corps, they
jointly moved for a stay of the proceedings. 121 Alabama and the Corps
had reached an agreement to attempt to negotiate an agreement.122
During this time, Florida attempted to join the litigation as a plaintiff
and Georgia attempted to join as a defendant, but the motions to inter-
vene were dismissed without prejudice because the case was moved to
an inactive docket after the Alabama-Corps agreement. 123 Florida and
Georgia alternatively sought to join the negotiations.1 24 Alabama and
the Corps agreed to allow Florida and Georgia to participate in the
negotiations under the condition that Alabama and the Corps would
jointly file for termination of the agreement if Florida or Georgia with-
drew from the discussions. 125 This provision prevented the exit of
Florida or Georgia to stop the negotiations between Alabama and the
Corps.126 However, Alabama or the Corps could terminate the agree-
ment with written notice and an 80-day grace period after notice is
given.127 In a further stipulation, the Corps agreed not to participate in
any water contracts pertaining to the issue at hand.128 The agreement
to negotiate was successful at halting litigation but did nothing to
reach a resolution for the growing water demand and dwindling supply
in the ACF region. 129
119. Id. at 1123 (Alabama contended that the EA was not detailed enough to highlight
the true impact of the change in allocation.)
120. Id. at 1123 n.5.
121. Id. at 1123.
122. Verdicts and Appeals, LIGHTFOOT LLC, http://www.lightfootlaw.com/law-firm/
verdicts-appeals-details.cfm?ID=176.
123. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d at 1123.
124. Stacy Shelton, Water Wars: GOP shift new reality as tri-state talks begin, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Jan. 6, 2003), available at http://www.propertyrightsresearch.org/
water wars.htm.
125. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d at 1123 n.8.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1123.
128. Id. (This was critical to Alabama and Florida because they felt the Corps had
secretly, through backdoor deals reached prior contractual agreements with Georgia.).
129. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d at 1123.
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C. The Compact: An Attempted Western Water Solution to an
Eastern Water Problem
Two years after the stay, the negotiations had not accomplished
much and the water demands for Metro Atlanta remained the same.
Because of the lack of action and with pressure from Georgia, the
group entered into a Memorandum of Agreement. 130 The agreement
"allowed existing withdrawals of water from Lake Lanier to continue
or to increase in response to reasonable demand" and allowed "the
Corps to abandon the Post Authorization Change Notification Re-
port."13 1 The negotiations continued and began to gain more attention
from political leaders. 132 The attention resulted in the passage of the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact ("ACF Com-
pact") in 1997, which focused on governing the process to reach a
solution between the states.133
The Compact was approved with purposes of "promoting inter-
state comity, removing causes of present and future controversies,
equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF, engaging in
water planning, and developing and sharing common data bases."134
Each state was given one vote and all decisions required a unanimous
vote of the three State Commissioners. 13 5 The compact also charged
the parties with developing an
allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface waters of
the ACF Basin among the states while protecting the water quality,
ecology and biodiversity of the ACF, as provided in the Clean Water
Act, ... the Endangered Species Act, ... the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act,... the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,... and other
applicable federal laws.136
Unlike interstate water compacts in the past, this particular compact
failed to provide guidance in allocation or a means to calculate alloca-
130. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2011)
(The MOA committed the groups to working together and nothing more.).
131. Id. (The 1992 MOA was arguably the most productive result of the negotiations.).
132. Stacy Shelton, Water Wars: GOP shift new reality as tri-state talks begin, ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Jan. 6, 2003, http://www.propertyrightsresearch.org/water-wars
.htm.
133. Id.
134. Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, § 1,
Art. I, 111 Stat. 2219 (1997).
135. Id. § 1, Art. VI(d).
136. Id. § 1, Art. VII(a).
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tion, which is normally found in compacts. 137 Subsequently, the
compact expired in September 2003 with no agreement.138
D. Magnuson's Mandate
After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate through the compact,
Georgia, Florida and Alabama found themselves back in the hands of
the judicial system.139 Four different, but issue-related lawsuits chal-
lenged the conduct of the Corps.1 40 Four water suppliers 41
successfully moved to have the cases consolidated, and Judge Paul
Magnuson was chosen by the federal multidistrict panel to decide the
case. 142 In an unexpected move, Judge Magnuson, a veteran of west-
ern water wars visiting from Minneapolis, 143 delivered an opinion that
even he considered "draconian."144 Judge Magnuson, "gave Georgia,
Florida and Alabama until July 2012 to work out an agreement to
share water from Lanier and the rest of the Chattahoochee River sys-
tem. . ."145 This ruling placed the first real deadline on political leaders
from the three states to address the water issue.146 The ruling allowed
137. APALACHICOLA-CHATTAHOOCHEE-FLINT RIVER BASIN COMPACT, PL
105-104, November 20, 1997, 111 Stat 2219. (The compact gives authority to address the
issue but fails to provide guidance that is historically found in other water compacts.).
138. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1175 (11th Cir.
2011).
139. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 481 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1353.
140. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 481 F.Supp.2d 1351, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2007)
("State of Alabama, et al. v. U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers, et al., C.A. No. 1:90-1331
Northern District of Florida . .. State of Florida v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, et
al., C.A. No. 4:06-410 Northern District of Georgia . . . State of Georgia v. The United States
Army Corp. of Engineers, et al., C.A. No. 1:06-1473 .. . State of Georgia v. United States
Corp. of Engineers, et al., C.A. No. 2:01-26"); see also Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 144 Fed. Appx. 850 (11th Cir. 2005).
141. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 481 F.Supp.2d at 1352 n.1 ("Atlanta Regional
Commission; the City of Atlanta, Georgia; Cobb County-Marietta Water Authority; and the
City of Gainesville, Georgia").
142. Id. at 1353.
143. Judge Magnuson recently completed Multidistrict Litigation for the Missouri
River. See generally In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17921 (D. Minn. 2003).
144. 11th U.S. Circuit To Consider Tri-state Water Dispute, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 9, 2011, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202485293241&slreturn=
1&hbxlogin=1 (Judge Magnuson knew his ruling would shake the entire debate around the
ACF region and lead this dispute towards an eventual resolution.).
145. Dave Williams, Ga. Senators Float Solution to Water Wars, ATLANTA BusINEss
CHRONICLE, Sep. 30, 2010, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/atlantalstories/2010/09/
27/daily56.html.
146. Id.
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for a settlement to be reached between the three states or for Congress
to pass legislation authorizing Lake Lanier as a regional water sup-
ply. 14 7 If this did not happen, the "order provides that water
withdrawals would be rolled back to levels not seen since the mid-
1970s."148
Judge Magnuson opined, "Congress authorized and paid for the
Buford Dam, and gave the Corps authority to operate the dam."149
Judge Magnuson's opinion went on to state that the authority given to
the Corps was not limitless.150 "Congress reserved to itself the power
to change the purposes for federal projects such as the Buford Dam
project."151 The Water Supply Act of 1958 specified that water stored
at Corps facilities could be reallocated for municipal and industrial us-
age as long as it did not harm authorized project purposes or involve
major structural changes. 152 With the above analysis, Judge
Magnuson was able to conclude that the Congressional approval for
the reallocation of storage in Lake Lanier is required, especially with
the Corps' own documents showing their belief that they needed con-
gressional authorization. 153 This conclusion meant that all decisions
made by the Corps outside the original approval of Congress had to be
set aside.154 .
As one would imagine, Georgia political leaders quickly ap-
pealed the decision to the Federal Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. 55 It became reasonably conclusive that the water wars had
reached a critical level. Metro Atlanta was faced with not having its
water needs met, and a water disaster appeared inevitable. In the ap-
peal to the Eleventh Circuit, Georgia argued that "the Corps has the
legal authority to release water from Lake Lanier to Atlanta." 56 Geor-
gia also leaned on public policy and argued that "Judge Magnuson did
not properly consider the harm his order would cause" to the millions
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Water Supply Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-500, § 301, 72 Stat. 319 (1958).
153. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F.Supp.2d at 1356. (Judge Magnuson was
not convinced that the Corps was within its discretion to regulate water usage of Lake
Lanier.)
154. Id.
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of people, business, industrials and government entities in the Metro
Atlanta area.157
This ruling did not go unnoticed by the business world. John
Brock, Chairman and CEO of Coca-Cola Enterprises stated, "It's going
to be cataclysmic."15 s He further said, "It's difficult to create jobs when
you don't have water."159 A statewide task force concluded that the
ruling could have a $30 billion negative impact on the Metro Atlanta
economy.o60 Georgia is not comfortable leaving the issue in the hands
of the courts and Governor Deal redoubled efforts to negotiate with
Florida and Alabama. 6 1 Deal indicated to business officials that he
believes the state should not expect the appeals court to "toss
Magnuson's ruling."162 In 2011, Deal met with the newly elected gov-
ernors of Alabama and Florida to discuss water problems.163
Gov. Deal revealed he was not convinced Congress would inter-
vene to solve the issue. 164 Deal's statement correctly reflects
longstanding congressional hesitation to get involved with past inter-
state water issues.165 However, it did not deter Georgia's senators
from getting involved. 6 6 Senators Isakson and Chambliss introduced
legislation giving the Corps authority to operate Buford Dam and Lake
Lanier to include allocations for municipal and industrial water sup-
ply, thus mooting Judge Magnuson's decision.167 The rejected bill
would have given sufficient congressional authority to the Corps, au-
thorizing the use of Lake Lanier for municipal and industrial water
supply.168
157. Id. at 5.
158. Id.
159. 11th U.S. Circuit To Consider Tri-state Water Dispute, supra note 122. (This
statement was made to draw more attention to the issue. When the statement was made,
unemployment was at an all time high.)
160. Id.
161. Id. (Gov. Deal has a strong legal background.)
162. Id.
163. Edgar Treiguts, Ga. Argues Case for Lanier Water, GPB NEWS, Mar. 8, 2011, http://
www.gpb.org/news/2011/03/08/ga-argues-case-for-lanier-water (This meeting took place in
the early part of 2011. The exact details have not been released.).
164. Shelton, supra note 130.
165. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 835.
166. Williams, supra note 127.
167. S. 12, 111th Cong. (2010).
168. Id. (This is the same authority Judge Magnuson opined the Corps lacked.).
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VI. PAST CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL WATER ACTIONS WITH TEETH
A. Colorado River Compact
Despite little success with the ACF region, congressional and
judicial involvement in interstate water issues is still possible. Just as
population growth is plaguing the ACF region, population growth in
southern California and Colorado led to concerns about the depletion of
water in the Colorado River.169 Political leaders in Arizona, Nevada,
Utah, Wyoming, Colorado and New Mexico were particularly afraid
that California would take all the water in the Colorado River by judi-
cially confirmed prior appropriation or legislative grants because
California was first in making beneficial usage of the water from the
river and had the most political power of the basin states.170 Farmers
in southern California had organized and begun to lobby the federal
government to allocate water to southern California. 171 They were cur-
rently getting water by way of a canal that ran through Mexico. 172 The
farmers wanted the federal government to build a new canal that
would run within the boundaries of the United States.173 Their actions
resulted in the All-American Canal, which is different from the Califor-
nia Aqueduct.
After several years of negotiations, the states were able to reach
an agreement on splitting the basin geographically, the amount of
water allocation for each state and the decision-making process moving
forward. 174 However, Arizona was not satisfied. Arizona did not feel
adequately protected from fast-growing California.17 5 This led to every
state ratifying the agreement except Arizona.176 Arizona's fears be-
came more concrete with the Congressional authorization of Boulder
Canyon Dam, which allowed an aqueduct to provide Colorado River
water to southern California.177 The remaining states were content to
move forward because they felt enough protection existed for them
within the agreement.a78 Arizona feared that California might have
secretly planned or hoped to get parts of Arizona's share because Ari-
169. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 804.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 804.
172. Id. at 803.
173. Id. at 804.
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zona could not physically withdraw the water.179 Arizona eventually
sued in the Supreme Court under original jurisdiction based upon the
theory that the congressionally approved Boulder Canyon Project Act
articulated the amount of water to be allocated to the states in the
area.180 The Supreme Court awarded Arizona allocations based upon
the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project.181 Arizona subsequently received
federal financial help to build the Central Arizona Project (CAP) which
lifted the water 1800 feet out of the river into canals that could then
use gravity flow to carry the water south to Arizona's heavily popu-
lated regions around Phoenix and Tucson. 182 The Colorado River
Compact symbolizes a compact where water allocations are determined
and controlled by the entities of the agreement.
B. Delaware River Compact
Another successful creation of an allocation compact is that of
the Delaware River. Population and industrial growth led a struggle
as to how the waters of the Delaware River would be allocated.183 Del-
aware, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania all declared interest
in the river.184 Compact attempts were defeated in 1925 and 1927 by
the New Jersey legislature.185 Due to the inability to compromise, law-
suits ensued.186 The Supreme Court reached a final, modified
agreement in 1954.187 This plan was not satisfactory to state and local
officials in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York and Delaware, though
New York City was pleased with the 800 million gallon per day alloca-
tion it received.188 In fact, state and local officials banded together and
179. Id.
180. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963).
181. Id. at 565 (CAP is the largest and most expensive aqueduct system ever
constructed in the U.S.)
182. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 807 (The CAP canal is 336 miles long.).
183. Id. at 853.
184. Id.
185. RICHARD ALBERT, DAMMING THE DELAWARE: THE RISE AND FALL OF TocKs ISLAND
DAM 17-20 (1987).
186. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (New Jersey was not comfortable
with the leverage being given to New York.).
187. New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
188. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 853-54. See also U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
CELEBRATING 50 YEARS OF COOPERATION, http://www.usgs.gov/features/ciwm2004.html, and
CITY OF NEW YORK, CANNONSVILLE, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/html/watershed
protection/cannonsville.shtml.
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sought a comprehensive plan with a multistate agency empowered to
implement the plan.189
The result was a regional plan that met the needs of the region,
the individual states and New York City with a means to administer in
times of unusual shortage.190 The Delaware River Basin Commission
was born from the comprehensive plan.19' The key to the commission
was that it was given broad power and authority.192 The commission
was directed to act in the best interests of the region, which served as a
balancing technique to protect the interest of the people of the various
states. 193 Today the Delaware River Basin Commission is still opera-
tional. 194 In 1996, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge stated the
following about the Delaware River Basin Commission:
Our great Commonwealth was founded by the spirit of community
and will continue to grow and prosper as we look to dedicated orga-
nizations such as yours for guidance, information and
protection. . . . [Y]our efforts to promote interstate comity and to
remove the causes of controversy among the states in the uses of
water resources are unquestionably worthy of honor. 95
During the same year, Delaware Governor Thomas Carper stated, "the
Commission, which pioneered the concept of partnerships, has the
tools through its organizational structure to oversee a unified approach
to the development and control of the river system without regard to
political boundaries."9 e
The Colorado River Compact and the Delaware River Compact
are two prime examples of the elements a successful compact must pos-
sess. The ACF Compact, which was designed to settle an allocation
dispute, lacked the critical component of a firm set of allocation princi-
ples that the states willingly agreed to accept.' 97 In the ACF, the
compact itself was to serve as the forum in which the states would set-
tle the entities at conflict.' 98 The party states, unable to agree before,
189. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 853-54.
190. Id. at 854.
191. DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
OVERVIEW, http://www.state.nj.us/drbdover.htm (the largest water compromise commission
in the east).
192. Id.
193. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 854
194. This year the Delaware River Basin Commission celebrates 50 years of existence.
DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMMISSION, http://www.state.nj.us/drbc.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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remained unable to agree and the compact failed.199 The exercise was
at the best an exercise in faith and at worst, pointless.200 The ACF
Compact amounted to an additional action that merely prolonged the
disagreement of the ACF problem. 201
C. Congress Decides
Congress possesses a tool to handle interstate water issues, but
rarely uses it. "The authority of Congress to apportion the waters of
interstate rivers is an aspect of its power to regulate commerce among
the several states."202 States are constitutionally required to adhere to
congressional action because of the supremacy power held over the
states. 203 There are only two times in the Nation's history that Con-
gress has actually exercised this power. 204 The first time was in 1928
with the Boulder Canyon Project. 205 The second time was in 1990,
when congressional apportionment was used in dividing the waters of
the Truckee and Carson Rivers and Lake Tahoe between California
and Nevada. 206 Some argue that the lack of usage isn't because of the
lack of interstate water issues. 207 However, the lack of usage is a di-
rect effect of the "political process in the legislative branch and the
equal [state] representation in the U.S. Senate. . .."208 Considering to-
day's political climate, the other 47 states, with the possible exception
of Tennessee, will be very disinclined to get involved and decide the
water conflict between Florida, Georgia and Alabama.
D. The High Court Takes a Dive
Regardless of the Eleventh Circuit's decision concerning Geor-
gia's appeal of Judge Magnuson's ruling, the case will very likely be
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
finds its authority to decide such a conflict in the Constitution, which




202. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 835.
203. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
204. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 835.
205. Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1958).
206. Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-618, § 204, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990).
207. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 835.
208. Id.
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which a State shall be a party.209 Therefore, if the states fail to agree
or Congress declines to act, the Supreme Court is well within jurisdic-
tion to hear a case concerning disputes about interstate waters. 2 10
Aside from negotiations, judicial apportionments, or "equitable appor-
tionments," have become a principal instrument of relief for interstate
water disputes. 211
Though federal courts have been very involved in water dis-
putes, there are only three cases in which the Supreme Court has
actually taken an interstate waterway and apportioned the waters.2 12
Two cases involved states located in water districts that follow prior
appropriation doctrine. 2 13 The remaining case, a water conflict be-
tween New Jersey and New York 214, was jurisdictionally in a region
that follows the riparian doctrine.215 However, the Supreme Court has
held on several other occasions that the then-current state of affairs is
209. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. See also SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 858.
210. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
211. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 858.
212. Id. at 868. See generally Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1992), Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) and New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
213. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 868. See generally Prior Appropriation, WATER
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Po-Re/Prior-Appropriation.html ("The
prior appropriation doctrine is a legal concept that evolved in the American West as a
means of establishing the right to use scarce water from rivers and streams. This doctrine
can be summed up as 'first in time is first in line.' The prior appropriation doctrine is
distinguished from the riparian doctrine, under which those who own land next to water
have rights to use the water. The historic requirements for a valid water right under the
prior appropriation doctrine are the intent to divert water, the actual diversion of water,
and the application of that water to beneficial use. As the West has evolved from an
economy built on mining and agriculture, the prior appropriation doctrine has begun to
address new needs for water. . .. The prior appropriation doctrine often is administered in a
context of scarcity, either because flows in western American rivers can be highly variable,
or because too many water rights were claimed in the river. Priority is given to those with
older water rights. A senior appropriator can satisfy his or her water needs before a junior
appropriator can take water from a river. In a drought year, only a few users may be able to
get water. Water rights are spoken of as being property rights, but the description is not
entirely accurate.").
214. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
215. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 870. See generally Prior Appropriation, WATER
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/Re-St/Rights-Riparian.html ("The
original definition of 'riparian' derives from its Latin origin, ripa, meaning 'bank of a
stream.' But in law, the term 'riparian' may refer to land different than what geographically
extends away from the stream. Legal definitions may be as inclusive as all the land under
the continuous title of the same landowner whose ownership begins beside the stream. The
humid zones of eastern North America had little water law before the 1820s. The riparian
doctrine in the United States exists as a legal structure for the human use of stream water
in the 'humid states': specifically, the states east of the first tier of states west of the
Mississippi River.").
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not inequitable under the equitable apportionment doctrine. 216 As dis-
cussed previously, the states dependent upon the Delaware River were
not pleased with the results of equitable apportionment and ultimately
established an agreement. 217 The slow pace of negotiations and agree-
ment between Georgia, Florida and Alabama almost ensures the
Supreme Court will ultimately get involved in this water dispute. The
states have the power to prevent that intervention only if they reach
an agreement or coax Congress to act.
VII. A SOUTHERN PROBLEM WITH A TRUE SOUTHERN SOLUTION
A. The "Volunteer" Solution
It will be very difficult for Georgia, Florida and Alabama to
reach a solution on the water issue. Additionally, if they reached a
solution it would only be a matter of time before that solution would be
inadequate, because the ACF region is not constant. The region and its
water needs are growing. As the population in Metro Atlanta in-
creases, industrial and business sectors grows, farmers are charged
with producing more crops and the eco-system is further damaged in
the Apalachicola Bay due to low water flow, water demand from a lim-
ited source is increasing. Realistically, the southeast region and this
nation cannot afford to sit idle as Atlanta dies of thirst and farmers
lose the ability to grow food that feeds all citizens. It has become ap-
parent to many that the water produced in the ACF river region is not
enough to satisfy the demand that presently exists and will continue
growing.
The only real solution is to provide more water to the region.
This reflects the true western solution of simply importing more water.
There exists a very adequate water supply less than 100 miles away
from existing water supplies in the Metro Atlanta area; that water
supply is the Tennessee River. This note does not extensively examine
the hostile proposal to move the state of Georgia line north less than a
mile due to a 19th century surveyor's error.2 18 If the error were cor-
216. See generally Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) and Colorado v. Kansas,
320 U.S. 383 (1944).
217. SAX ET AL., supra note 5, at 870.
218. Greg Bluestein, Drought Has Georgia Revisiting Border Dispute, WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 10, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/09/
AR2008020902283.html ("Nearly two centuries after a flawed survey placed Georgia's
northern border just short of the Tennessee River, some legislators are thirsting to set the
record straight. A historic drought has added urgency to Georgia's generations-old claim
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rected, that would place the Georgia and Tennessee border in the
center of the Tennessee River. 219 However, to take that route would
foster negative relations between Georgia and Tennessee. The possi-
bility remains that the High Court could determine the one-mile strip
of land belongs to Tennessee.
Georgia and Tennessee are able to make competing arguments
that the disputed land should be granted to each of them. Case law
and each state's code support their arguments, and those are two ma-
jor factors in the weighing of a Supreme Court decision. 220 Georgia
would make its strongest argument that in order to redefine or move
state borders, the Constitution requires consent by both states and
Congress. 221 Georgia would argue that it was admitted to the union
eight years before Tennessee 222 and thus its northern border was de-
fined as being located at the 35th Parallel line.2 2 3 Georgia can argue
that the state has never consented to moving the state line from its
"rightful," congressionally defined location. 224 Thus, Georgia could
claim that the line remains where it was originally established with
the creation of Georgia. Tennessee would attempt to show that Geor-
gia's inaction in regards to the state line resulted in a relinquishment
of ownership. 225 Tennessee's argument to victory must convince the
court that she has "engaged in meaningful conduct that evidences an
actual exercise of sovereignty and control over the disputed area of
land, while Georgia must have evidenced a concurrent failure to do
so."226 In a previous case surrounding the same strip of land, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated that due to an error in an
1818 survey, a dispute exists around "a strip of land which has been
claimed by both states for 156 years."227 The court further said, "Citi-
zens of the area live with numerous anomalies-real estate taxes may
be paid to both states, people may go to school in one state while pay-
that its territory should extend about a mile farther north and reach into the Tennessee - a
river with about 15 times the flow of the one Atlanta depends on for water.").
219. Id.
220. O'Day et al., supra note 11, at 262.
221. Id.
222. Statehood Dates, http://www.50states.com/statehood.htm
223. Jennie Jarvie, In drought, water found: Next Door, Los Angeles Times, February
10, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/10/nation/na-waterlO.
224. Georgia Legislative History, http://library.law.emory.edulfor-law-students/emory-
law-subject-guides/georgia-and-state-law/georgia-legislative-history/.
225. Id. at 264.
226. Id.
227. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 495 F. 2d 1070, 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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ing taxes in another, and so on." 228 It is very unclear how the court
would decide.
The state of Georgia should proceed with caution in this matter
in the event Georgia is forced to sit at the table of negotiation with
Tennessee in the future. On a brighter note, as this note concludes, the
need for water in the ACF region could lead to huge economic gains for
the state of Tennessee. The possibility exists for the state of Tennessee
to sell water to the ACF region in which the states of Georgia, Alabama
and Florida would proportionately cover the bill. As further discussed
in this note, states have historically sold state resources in ways that
benefit the entire state.
B. The Oil and Water Model That Will Mix
A great model of this concept is the Alaskan Permanent Fund
Dividend Program.229 Before the discovery of oil, the state of Alaska
operated on an annual budget just over $100 million.230 The first lease
by the Alaskan government to oil companies yielded a profit of over
$900 million. 231 The people of Alaska entered into a debate on how to
spend the money. 232 "After a four year debate the Alaska State Legis-
lature decided in 1980 in favor of a savings trust for the future,"
creating the Alaskan Permanent Fund Corporation. 233 "The same year
the Legislature also created the Permanent Fund Dividend Program,
retroactive to January 1, 1979, to distribute a portion of the income of
the Permanent Fund each year to eligible Alaskans as a dividend pay-
ment."234 "This was the historic beginning of an annual program
paying to Alaskan citizens a fair and equal share of the wealth from
publicly owned resources."235 This type of program could be estab-
lished for the citizens of Tennessee. However, based on Tennessee's
population in comparison to Alaska, the state may favor the option of
using the funds for vital state projects instead of individual checks.
228. Id.
229. http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/ (last visited May 27, 2012).




233. Alanna Hartzok, The Alaska Permanent Fund: A Model of Resource Rents for





374 FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 7:2:345
The people of Tennessee will first need to be convinced that subtrac-
tions from the Tennessee River will not hurt them in any way. 23 6
C. The Tennessee River
The Tennessee River is 650 miles long. 2 3 7 The river drains a
41,000 square mile basin. 238 The basin covers seven states, including
parts of extreme northeast Georgia. 239 The main stem of the Tennes-
see River is controlled by nine major dams.240 The Tennessee River at
Nickajack, an area close to Georgia and the best place to transfer
water, has an average flow of 24 billion gallons per day. 2 4 1 This is 15
times greater than the flow of the Chattahoochee River. 242
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 2004 Reservoir Opera-
tions Study concluded that an additional 1 billion gallons per day in
inter-basin transfers, in addition to the current in-state, inter-basin
transfers, would have almost no effect on its reservoir levels. 24 3 The
Metro Atlanta region is projected to need an additional 264 million gal-
lons per day in 2030 to meet water demands. 244 The Tennessee River
could easily satisfy Metro Atlanta's water need and help meet the de-
mand for water in the ACF region. The TVA made a comparison of
Metro Atlanta and other large metro areas in stating:
236. Convincing may be necessary if the people of Tennessee are overwhelmingly
determined to maintain water from the River. Tennessee passed an inter basin water
transfer act. The act requires public water suppliers that propose new or increased inter-
basin transfers to apply for and be granted a permit. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941
(1982), the court ruled that a Nebraska inter-basin transfer law violated the Commerce
Clause because of its reciprocity requirement. Though such requirement does not exist in
the Tennessee Act, the Tennessee River is an interstate river that converses several states
with great interstate dimension. The river provides irrigation for agriculture, a route for
navigation and produces hydroelectricity for many in the southeast and mid-eastern states.
There is significant federal interest in the Tennessee River. Tennessee's possible denial of a
permit to Georgia could stir a huge public policy issue of discrimination, thus violating the
commerce clause.





241. William Bradley Carver et al., Tapping the Tennessee River at Georgia's Northwest
Corner: A Solution to North Georgia's Water Supply Crisis 1, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2011
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[Inter-basin transfers] are a well-established water management
tool, and it is no coincidence that six of the seven US metro areas
larger than Atlanta (New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston,
Dallas, and Miami) rely heavily on them. With a population of over
5 million, metro Atlanta is one of the fastest growing urban areas in
the country, but the Chattahoochee is the smallest river to be the
primary water source for a major city. From the standpoint of his-
toric national water policy, an IBT to metro Atlanta from the
Tennessee River would be no less appropriate than the ones sup-
porting those other major urban areas. 245
In the conclusion of its sensitivity study, the TVA stated, "This
sensitivity analysis shows that [inter-basin transfers] are not likely to
substantially affect future reservoir elevations, either under the Base
Case or under the most conservative assumptions for the policy alter-
natives under most hydrologic conditions ."246
VIII. CONCLUSION
As Chief Judge Britt stated in North Carolina v. Hudson, a case
involving an inter-basin transfer to Virginia Beach, Virginia, "water is
a necessity of life" and "[i]t is a valuable resource which must be pro-
tected and conserved and shared by all."2 4 7 The final decisions that are
made in regards to the ACF region will be monumental in nature. De-
priving Metro Atlanta of water would have effects of grand proportions
and would send detrimental ripples throughout the national and global
economies. Farmers in Alabama and Georgia should not be deprived of
access to water. Finally, the Apalachicola Bay area is essential to life
in the panhandle region and a critical route for commercial activity by
way of inland ports.248
A compromise by the states, regardless of the decision, would
ultimately result in one or two of these areas not getting sufficient
water resources needed to sustain them. The most appropriate and
maximum solution does not lie in reaching a solution on the water re-
sources available now, but to seek additional water resources to add to
the current supply resulting in an adequate solution for the demand.
Metro Atlanta is located in very close proximity to a river that flows
245. Id. at 2.
246. Id. at 1 (citing TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, RESERVOIR OPERATIONS STUDY -
FINAL PROGRAMMATIc EIS APP. D9 INTER-BASIN TRANSFERs-A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
(2004), http://www.tva.gov/environment/reports/ros-eis/ros rod.pdf).
247. North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1273 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
248. APALACHICOLA BAY SYSTEM http://www.ucsusa.org/gulflgcplacesapa.html.
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with great volume. A Tennessee River water transfer is the preferred
solution to the threat facing Metro Atlanta and the AFC region.
Georgia, Florida and Alabama should immediately come to the
table with Tennessee and work out a plan under which the three states
can purchase water from the state of Tennessee. This plan would be a
win-win for the ACF region and the Tennessee economy. A commission
could be created to oversee the project or this project could be insti-
tuted as an extension of the TVA. Either way, the time to start is now.
As global weather patterns become more unpredictable and people mi-
grate south, a sufficient supply of water will be significant in the
extension of life in the ACF region as we know it.
Georgia, Florida, Alabama and Tennessee have the unique abil-
ity to show the world why we are the United States of America. The
U.S. comes together in times of adversity and finds solutions when
others have given up. As underdeveloped colonies, the U.S. fought a
well-established country to gain independence. The U.S. was the first
to the moon. The U.S. built megacities like Las Vegas in the middle of
the desert. We tamed great rivers with structures like the Hoover
Dam. 2 4 9 It is equally as important that we get it right. Bad projects
have imperiled the Everglades, caused the near loss of New Orleans
and extirpated salmon runs in the west.250 We can overcome this
water challenge in the southeast and we can do it with the American
spirit of ingenuity behind us.
249. City of Las Vegas, http://www.lasvegasnevada.gov/factsstatistics/history.htm
250. See generally Everglades Foundation, http://www.lasvegasnevada.gov/facts
statistics/history.htm; See generally New Orleans Levees, http://www.neworleanslevee.com/;
See generally Save Our Wild Salmon, http://www.wildsalmon.org/index.php?option=com-
content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1
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